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Thinking About the Rest of the
World: Mental Health and Rights
Outside the ‘First World’*
PETER BARTLETT
I. Introduction
The considerable preponderance of literature relating to mental health law is
framed in the context of economically advantaged countries, primarily in North
America, Western Europe and Australia and New Zealand. These origins are
reflected in a specific set of assumptions regarding mental health law. These
assumptions in part relate to the nature of the legal subject. These are countries
where modern legal forms flow from a broadly post-enlightenment mentality,
where individual rights and liberties are the stuff of national identity. Rights to
control civil confinement, or to control mandatory psychiatric treatment, have
developed in these jurisdictions in the context of this broader legal culture.
The economic and cultural context also shapes the context of litigation in
other ways. Extensive, politically developed and largely benevolent (if often
paternalistic) psychiatric professions, coupled with increasingly active user
groups, have made a significant impression on the form and organisation of
services. Relative to other parts of the world, people with mental disorders in
economically advantaged countries benefit from access to inpatient and outpa-
tient specialist care of a comparatively high standard, availability of modern
psychiatric treatments, and programmes of care, support, accommodation and
* While much of my understanding in this area has benefited from my work with the Mental
Disability Advocacy Center (MDAC) in Budapest, including as a board member for that organisation,
the views expressed are my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of that organisation (nor, of
course, the University of Nottingham nor the Nottinghamshire Healthcare NHS Trust). I have further
benefitted from involvement in a project to reform the mental health law in Lesotho, a project
graciously funded by the Nuffield Foundation. My thanks to Rachel Jenkins of the Institute of
Psychiatry, King’s College London, for providing generous comments on a draft of this chapter, and to
the participants at the Prato workshop for their insights.
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financial assistance within the community. The form and standards of all of these
programmes are quite appropriately the subject of ongoing research, debate,
complaint, and litigation. Nonetheless, the existence of these standards of care
fundamentally affects the approach to and the context of litigation in these
nations.
This developed economic and legal culture is in the background of many of
the papers in this volume. Insofar as the authors in this volume question the
appropriateness of ‘rights-based legalism’, it is in the context of societies where
moves towards such legalism have been on the political agenda for decades. At
least some of the mores of that legalism are already integrated at least to some
degree into the practices of compulsion in psychiatry: anyone who was going to
be amenable to a legalistic or human rights approach is already talking that talk,
although not necessarily always walking that walk as much as we would like. The
question in these developed countries is less likely to be ‘was all that ever a good
idea’, than ‘have we achieved as much through this route as we can hope for’.
Outside this rather narrow band of developed countries, the situation is
markedly different. Human rights as understood in developed countries, and in
particular the human rights of persons with mental disabilities, are not as high
on the political, justice, social or professional agendas. Social Services are grossly
underfunded by the standards of developed countries, and have to operate in a
context of far lower government expenditure on the health, educational and
social sectors as a whole. Institutional standards may often be distressingly poor.
In countries where large mental hospitals and other related institutions have been
long established, such as those in central and eastern Europe, there is often little
or no local experience of de-institutionalisation and transition from central
institutions to local comprehensive care. Mental health legislation and regulation
often ranges from the minimal to the non-existent. Frequently, such legislation as
there is has become significantly out-dated. Certainly, there is often no history or
tradition of legalism of the sort that developed ‘western’ nations now largely take
for granted.
The questions to be addressed by this chapter are thus rather different to the
others in this volume. It is not whether we have achieved as much as we could
hope for, but rather is the rights-based endeavour worth promoting at all in such
a markedly different resource, professional and cultural context? Or would
people with mental disabilities in these countries be better served by some other
form of reform agenda?
It will be clear from what follows that rights-based legalism is not enough on
its own. At a minimum, provision of an appropriate infrastructure of services
(however we wish to define ‘appropriate’), more direct involvement of users
throughout the mental health system, and widespread challenges to stigma
throughout these societies are also required. This will not be news to the readers
of this volume from economically advantaged countries, as it reflects experience
in the developed world over the last roughly 40 years. The question is not
whether rights-based legalism is enough; it is instead whether it should be a part
of the way forward.
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II. Rights as a Model
If we are to discuss the desirability of ‘rights-based legalism’, it is of course
necessary to define the field. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, rights
may mean a wide variety of things. Within classic human rights, there are a
variety of ‘fundamental’ rights, essentially to be free from state intervention: the
right to liberty, the right to security of the person (sometimes taken to include a
right to make decisions regarding medical treatment), the right to judicial
processes and equality before the law, and the right to privacy, for example.
Variations on these rights are contained in most post-enlightenment human
rights instruments—the European Convention on Human Rights,1 the African
Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights,2 the Canadian Charter,3 the American
Bill of Rights,4 and so forth. Most of these instruments currently offer some form
of legal redress for individuals who consider that their rights under these
instruments has been infringed. The issues of access to justice that have long been
the stuff of socio-legal analysis are of course important limitations for potential
litigants, but in most of the world, these rights are at least in theory enforceable.
Over the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, human rights law has
moved increasingly into rights of social participation, however. Some of these
rights are also part of the traditional corpus—the right to vote, for example—but
in recent decades the number and scope of these rights have been expanding.
Rights to standards of services and standards of institutional care, and rights to
health care are obvious examples. The recent United Nations Convention on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities, discussed elsewhere in this volume, provides a
particularly broad array of these rights to participation.5 These rights can be
interesting in the context of mental health law, as they change the way those
involved in the system are grouped. For the classic legal rights, persons with
mental health problems are often pressing their right against their treatment
provider: civilly detained patients litigating for their freedom against their
1 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European
Convention on Human Rights), opened for signature 4 November 1950, CETS No 005 (entered into
force 3 September 1953).
2 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, opened for signature 27 June 1981, 1520 UNTS
217 (entered into force 21 October 1986).
3 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Constitution Act, 1982. Enacted as Schedule B to the
Canada Act 1982 (UK) c 11 (entered into force 17 April 1982).
4 The Bill of Rights is the name by which the first 10 amendments to the Constitution of the
United States of America are known. They entered into force on 15 December 1791.
5 United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, adopted 13 December
2006, GA Res 61/106. UN Doc A/Res/61/106 (entered into force 3 May 2008). See in particular rights
to accessibility (art 9), freedom from exploitation (art 16); community living (19), education (art 24),
health (art 25), habilitation and rehabilitation (art 26), work and employment (art 27), adequate
standards of living and social protection (art 28); participation in public and political life (art 29),
participation in cultural life, leisure activities and sport (art 30). See also Oliver Lewis, this volume, ch
5; Annegret Kämpf, this volume, ch 6 and Tina Minkowitz, this volume, ch 7.
Mental Health and Rights Outside the ‘First World’ 399
Columns Design Ltd / Job: McSherry / Division: Ch17 /Pg. Position: 3 / Date: 22/7
JOBNAME: McSherry PAGE: 4 SESS: 6 OUTPUT: Wed Jul 28 10:48:01 2010
treating psychiatrist, for example. Second generation rights, however, may instead
be about systemic provision, and thus service providers and service users may be
united on the same side. A service user litigating for better mental health services
may well be supported by his or her treatment team, not litigating against them.
The real target of such litigation may be those in government in charge of
resource allocation.
Enforceability of these second generation rights by aggrieved individuals will
depend on the instrument in which they are contained. Often, the most relevant
rights (such as the right to health, and the right to community living) are
circumscribed with language that limits the effect of the right, or are not directly
enforceable by individuals. One way of engaging with the desirability of ‘rights-
based legalism’, therefore, would be to ask whether substantive buttressing and
more direct enforcement of these rights would be an appropriate way forward,
since ‘rights-based legalism’ will be beneficial only if relevant rights are available
for enforcement.
The trend in recent years has been to require that these rights are provided in a
non-discriminatory fashion. Of particular relevance for current purposes, non-
discrimination on the basis of disability has increasingly become a matter of legal
and public policy. In developed countries, this has placed the law relating to
people with mental disabilities in a new context. Justifications for legal interven-
tions are no longer as clear as they once were—a topic for a different time, but an
important topic nonetheless. For current purposes, the point is that in human
rights law, the mere existence of a mental disability is no longer an obvious
justification in itself for differential legal treatment, nor for the deprivation of
rights. This is not of course to say that human rights law need be blind to
different circumstances. Requirements to make ‘reasonable accommodation’ to
accommodate the needs of persons with disabilities are an obvious example
where consideration of difference is in itself a human rights requirement. Such
concepts are generally intended to buttress the rights of affected individuals
however, not to restrict them.
That may be taken as the broad structure of human rights. Any departure from
these rights raises particular theoretical problems. By definition, these rights are
meant to be universal: they are to apply to everybody, in all countries signing the
relevant instrument. Allowing a ‘pick and mix’ approach to people who warrant
human rights protection raises dangerous precedents within countries: if some
groups do not warrant protection, why not others?
A considerable amount of debate regarding mental health law and service
provision in developed nations has in recent years moved away from rights-based
analysis. Even a number of papers in this volume seem to consider that the key
rights issue is now optimising service provision and good outcomes, as defined
by medical indicators. Questions of coercion become re-phrased to make them
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appear human rights neutral.6 Expressly or by implication, the classic rights
questions about whether people with mental disabilities should be permitted to
refuse compulsion, or the development of firm and objective criteria for compul-
sion, are viewed as somehow old-fashioned, quaint, ‘SO 10 years ago’. Yet moves
away from strong affirmations of human rights in our own countries undercut
the credibility of human rights arguments abroad. In an international context,
departures from universality also raise problems of credibility for the human
rights project overall: how are we to pressure a nation known for human rights
violations to comply with human rights instruments, if our own countries nation
are themselves choosing to depart from those ‘universal’ norms when convenient
to do so? Whether this is an appropriate approach for developed countries is
outside the scope of this chapter, but for the sake of persons in other countries,
both within the mental disability field and outside it, for whom fundamental
rights have not been achieved and may have real import, this is not a position we
should sleep-walk into.
The pursuit of these rights however implies a level of legalism. As noted above,
access to courts for the determination of civil rights is itself a part of the human
rights framework, and a move from it may itself imply a human rights violation.
‘Rights-based legalism’ may perhaps be taken to extend beyond the territory of
traditional human rights, defined in international treaties and post-
enlightenment national constitutions. In many countries, legal regulation of
matters relating to mental disability extends into areas that are not necessarily
pivotal to human rights as defined above, and these areas may at least in theory
be subject to litigation. English law, for example, allows judicial challenge of a
broad array of decisions made by a public authority, including the National
Health Service, and occasionally litigation has arisen in a psychiatric context that
does not raise obvious human rights issues. We have in recent years seen an
application challenging an individual’s categorisation as ‘psychopathic’ rather
than ‘mentally ill’, for example.7 These cases are very much the exception,
however. English litigation in the mental health field is overwhelmingly about the
scope of basic freedoms, in particular rights to liberty and freedom from
involuntary treatment.
The arguments for rights-based legalism outside the classic human rights
context are quite different than for fundamental human rights issues. Here, the
arguments are likely to reflect skirmishes over power at a relatively specific level,
the micro-theatres of power that make Foucauldeans salivate. A defence of
rights-based legalism in this context might be based on the protection of some
form of power to the individual, which might in turn be taken to protect some
vestige of personal dignity. It might also be defended as a punitive/threatened
6 See, eg R Bonnie and J Monahan, ‘From Coercion to Contract: Reframing the Debate on
Mandated Community Treatment for People with Mental Disorders’ (2005) 29(4) Law and Human
Behavior 485.
7 R (on the application of B) v Ashworth Hospital Authority [2005] UKHL 20.
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procedural ‘stick’ in the background, which practitioners will avoid by better
engagement and communication with their patients/clients, an outcome that
seems highly desirable. The fact that such disagreements do not engage with
fundamental human rights thus does not necessarily mean a rights-based
approach is inappropriate.
Indeed, the use of law as a structure to these debates opens a somewhat
different view of human rights in mental health. Human rights, clearly in one
sense, is a set of principles and standards to which everyone in society is
entitled—a top-down vision defining how state action is restricted. But human
rights can also be viewed from the bottom up—a way in which a framework is
created for marginalised peoples to engage with (and to insist on engagement
with) the decisions that affect them, either as groups or as individuals. Without
that engagement, human rights law rather misses the point, since that engage-
ment is fundamental to the dignity of individuals and peoples that human rights
law presupposes. The right to refuse treatment is perhaps a helpful example.
Certainly, the right to refuse treatment is important because of classic political
doctrines concerning limitation of state power; but it is a reasonable speculation
that this is not the key concern of many people with mental disabilities who want
the right to refuse. Anecdotal evidence would suggest that few people with
psychiatric disabilities want to refuse all medication or treatment. For them, the
right to say ‘no’ is not about refusal of everything; it is about creating a long-stop
that requires the treatment provider to engage with them about the decisions that
will affect them. It is thus about articulation of the self, and about the individual
claiming his or her own dignity. It is about the determination not simply to
become a passive clinical object. This makes it about a very different vision of
human rights, and perhaps the most important vision. Without this legal
protection, the risk is that overworked clinicians use power as convenience, to
reach the ‘right’ clinical decision.
In practice, litigation that is clearly outside the scope of human rights
discourse is relatively rare. Much more frequent is litigation that, although taken
by the domestic courts to be outside the scope of human rights law, nonetheless
arguably engages human rights issues. In England in the last few years, for
example, we have seen courts fail to find that the European Convention on
Human Rights is engaged, let alone violated, in the cases, respectively, of an
individual lacking capacity being institutionalised over the objection of compe-
tent family carers,8 and of a competent and objecting individual being given
psychotropic medication.9 Human rights lawyers might see things rather differ-
ently from the courts in these cases, and, at least occasionally, Strasbourg has
8 Re S (Inherent Jurisdiction: Family Life) [2002] EWHC 2278 (Fam), esp at [39].
9 R (on the application of PS) v Responsible Medical Officer [2003] EWHC 2335 (Admin).
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shared this different view.10 For these issues, the distinction between human
rights and other rights-based legalism appears tenuous.
For purposes of the discussion that follows, the focus will be on decisions
within this somewhat broader ambit of human rights, focusing on compulsory
treatment, provision of services, institutional standards, detention, guardianship
and other civil rights. From the discussion that follows, it will be clear that these
issues appear to be relevant in central Europe and Africa, and they are included in
international instruments of which the relevant countries are parties—most
notably the European Convention on Human Rights and the African Charter on
Human and Peoples’ Rights. Both of these treaties have courts to interpret their
provisions, so in strategic terms, we can understand that we are talking not
merely about rights as a discursive mechanism, but also a mechanism with some
enforcement attached. For purposes of the distinctions drawn above, it will be
taken that these generally engage with human rights issues. ‘Purely’ non-human
rights related decisions, such as the categorisation question noted above, will not
form a part of this discussion.
III. What it’s Like In the Rest of the World
Basic demographic information regarding care in southern Africa and central
Europe is contained in table 1. The first point that becomes obvious from that
table is that ‘the rest of the world’ is not a homogenous place, and southern
Africa is in many ways as different from central Europe as both are from
economically privileged countries. Indeed, there is considerable variation
between countries in each of these regions, and no doubt within countries
themselves. Nonetheless, a few generalisations may be made.
A. Southern Africa
Much of Africa is, of course, chronically poor. It is not uncommon that average
annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is less than US$1000 per person. It is an
environment where often there have never been psychiatric services as would be
recognisable to a western European. Overall health budgets are miniscule,
10 Compare, for example, R v Bournewood Community and Mental Health NHS Trust, ex parte L
[1999] 1 AC 458 to HL v United Kingdom [2005] 40 EHRR 761.
Mental Health and Rights Outside the ‘First World’ 403
Columns Design Ltd / Job: McSherry / Division: Ch17 /Pg. Position: 7 / Date: 23/4
JOBNAME: McSherry PAGE: 8 SESS: 5 OUTPUT: Wed Jul 28 10:48:01 2010
Ta
b
le
1:
C
om
p
ar
at
iv
e
D
em
og
ra
p
h
ic
D
at
a
A
re
a
(K km
2
)
P
op
u
la
-
ti
on
(M
)
A
ve
r-
ag
e
G
D
P
$U
S
M
H
B
u
d
ge
t
as
% of
H
ea
lt
h
B
u
d
ge
t
P
er
10
,0
00
P
op
u
la
ti
on
P
er
10
0,
00
0
P
op
u
la
ti
on
A
re
a
p
er
p
sy
ch
ia
-
tr
is
t
(x
10
00
K
m
2
)
M
H
B
ed
s
(T
ot
al
)
M
H
B
ed
s
in M
H
H
os
p
i-
ta
ls
M
H
B
ed
s
in
G
en
er
al
H
os
p
i-
ta
ls
M
H
B
ed
s
in
ot
h
er
se
tt
in
gs
N
u
m
b
er
P
sy
ch
ia
-
tr
is
ts
N
u
m
b
er
of
M
H
N
u
rs
es
N
u
m
b
er
P
sy
ch
ol
-
og
is
ts
N
u
m
b
er
of
so
ci
al
w
or
ke
rs
S
A
fr
ic
a
A
n
go
la
1,
24
7
16
.4
2,
23
5
0
0.
13
0.
70
0.
60
0.
00
0.
00
0.
00
0.
00
0.
00
B
ot
sw
an
a
58
2
1.
8
7,
18
3
1%
1.
10
0.
70
0.
40
0.
00
0.
40
9.
00
0.
30
3.
00
80
.0
0
C
on
go
34
2
4.
0
1,
40
0
N
/A
0.
06
−
0.
06
−
0.
03
0.
10
0.
26
N
/A
34
2.
00
D
R
C
on
go
2,
34
5
58
.8
15
4
N
/A
0.
17
0.
15
0.
00
9
0.
00
9
0.
04
0.
03
0.
01
0.
40
10
0.
00
G
ab
on
26
8
1.
4
4,
92
8
.3
%
0.
70
0.
60
0.
06
0.
00
0.
30
1.
00
0.
50
2.
00
67
.0
0
Le
so
th
o
30
2.
1
71
4
7%
0.
80
0.
30
0.
50
0.
00
0.
05
0.
20
0.
09
1.
20
30
.0
0
M
al
aw
i
11
8
13
.6
26
3
2%
0.
37
N
/A
N
/A
N
/A
0.
00
2.
50
0.
00
0.
00
M
oz
am
bi
qu
e
79
9
21
.2
33
3
N
/A
0.
23
0.
20
0.
04
0.
01
0.
04
0.
01
0.
05
0.
01
21
.0
0
N
am
ib
ia
82
4
2.
1
3,
19
3
N
/A
1.
50
1.
50
0.
0
0.
00
0.
20
0.
00
6.
00
6.
00
20
6.
00
So
u
th
A
fr
ic
a
1,
22
8
48
.3
5,
68
3
N
/A
4.
50
4.
00
0.
38
0.
12
1.
20
7.
50
4.
00
20
.0
0
2.
00
Sw
az
ila
n
d
17
1.
1
2,
45
5
.3
%
2.
00
2.
00
0.
0
0.
00
0.
10
10
.0
0
0.
10
0.
10
17
.0
0
Z
am
bi
a
75
3
12
.0
92
5
0
0.
50
0.
17
0.
18
0.
07
0.
02
5.
00
0.
04
0.
04
15
0.
00
C
Eu
ro
p
e
B
os
n
ia
iH
51
4.
0
2,
56
8
N
/A
3.
60
2.
40
1.
0
0.
20
1.
80
10
.0
0
0.
50
0.
03
0.
70
B
u
lg
ar
ia
11
1
7.
6
4,
83
9
2.
5%
8.
30
4.
10
1.
90
2.
30
9.
00
15
.0
0
0.
90
0.
30
0.
16
C
ro
at
ia
57
4.
5
14
,4
95
N
/A
10
.0
6
8.
02
0.
98
1.
06
8.
70
N
/A
N
/A
N
/A
0.
14
404 Peter Bartlett
Columns Design Ltd / Job: McSherry / Division: Ch17 /Pg. Position: 1 / Date: 23/4
JOBNAME: McSherry PAGE: 9 SESS: 5 OUTPUT: Wed Jul 28 10:48:01 2010
C
ze
ch
R
ep
.
79
10
.4
21
,1
87
3%
11
.4
0
9.
80
1.
50
0.
20
12
.1
0
33
.0
0
4.
90
N
/A
0.
06
E
st
on
ia
45
1.
3
10
,0
46
N
/A
10
.2
0
8.
00
2.
10
0.
00
13
.0
0
0.
00
N
/A
N
/A
2.
60
H
u
n
ga
ry
93
10
.1
14
,0
94
8%
9.
60
2.
30
7.
20
0.
10
9.
00
19
.0
0
2.
00
1.
00
1.
00
La
tv
ia
64
2.
3
99
58
6.
3%
13
.8
0
13
.5
0
0.
30
0.
00
10
.0
0
40
.0
0
2.
00
0.
50
0.
27
Li
th
u
an
ia
65
3.
4
15
,3
00
7%
10
.0
0
8.
60
1.
10
0.
30
15
.0
0
36
.0
0
5.
00
N
/A
0.
13
Po
la
n
d
31
3
38
.1
11
,4
83
N
/A
7.
80
5.
20
1.
20
0.
60
6.
00
18
.4
0
3.
40
0.
60
0.
14
R
om
an
ia
23
8
22
.6
26
18
3%
7.
60
5.
50
2.
00
0.
20
4.
10
8.
90
4.
50
N
/A
0.
26
Sl
ov
ak
ia
49
5.
4
20
,0
75
5%
9.
00
6.
00
3.
00
0.
00
10
.0
0
32
.0
0
3.
00
1.
00
0.
91
C
om
p
ar
it
or
s
A
u
st
ra
lia
7,
68
2
20
.7
39
,3
00
9.
6%
3.
90
1.
20
2.
70
1.
00
14
.0
0
53
.0
0
5.
00
5.
00
2.
60
Fr
an
ce
54
7
63
.4
36
,4
17
8%
12
.0
0
7.
00
3.
0
2.
00
22
.0
0
98
.0
0
5.
00
N
/A
0.
04
U
K
24
4
60
.9
37
,4
00
10
%
5.
80
N
/A
N
/A
N
/A
11
.0
0
10
4.
00
9.
00
58
.0
0
0.
04
U
SA
9,
80
0
30
6.
0
47
,0
25
6%
7.
70
3.
10
1.
30
3.
30
13
.7
0
6.
50
31
.1
0
35
.3
0
0.
23
So
u
rc
es
So
u
rc
es
fo
r
da
ta
co
lu
m
n
s
1–
3:
U
K
an
d
A
u
st
ra
lia
G
D
P
:C
en
tr
al
In
te
lli
ge
n
ce
A
ge
n
cy
,W
or
ld
Fa
ct
B
oo
k
(W
as
h
in
gt
on
D
C
,C
IA
,2
00
9)
.A
ll
ot
h
er
fi
gu
re
s
U
K
Fo
re
ig
n
O
ff
ic
e
w
eb
si
te
(a
va
ila
bl
e
at
:w
w
w
.f
co
.g
ov
.u
k)
,a
cc
es
se
d
23
Fe
br
u
ar
y
20
09
.S
om
e
fi
gu
re
s
pr
ed
at
e
th
e
re
ce
n
t
ec
on
om
ic
di
ff
ic
u
lt
ie
s.
So
u
rc
e
fo
r
da
ta
co
lu
m
n
s
4–
11
:W
or
ld
H
ea
lt
h
O
rg
an
iz
at
io
n
,M
en
ta
lH
ea
lt
h
A
tl
as
20
05
(G
en
ev
a,
W
H
O
,2
00
5)
.
Mental Health and Rights Outside the ‘First World’ 405
Columns Design Ltd / Job: McSherry / Division: Ch17 /Pg. Position: 2 / Date: 23/4
JOBNAME: McSherry PAGE: 10 SESS: 6 OUTPUT: Wed Jul 28 10:48:01 2010
sometimes as low as a few dollars per capita per year.11 Mental health budgets are
in turn a small proportion of that, and are largely devoted to staff salaries and a
small number of inpatient beds. In a number of southern African countries, there
appears to be virtually no state investment in mental health services at all. In
others, where figures were available, in most cases the mental health budget was
less than two per cent of the health budget. Mental health tends to be under-
funded in most countries of the world, relative to the impact of mental health on
quality-adjusted life years (QuALYs);12 but these figures are extreme, particularly
when placed in the context of tiny overall health budgets.
The result is minimal specialist service provision. According to the World
Health Organization in 2005, there were no psychiatrists in either Angola or
Malawi.13 Elsewhere, psychiatrists are exceptionally rare. Only in the Republic of
South Africa (RSA) does the number exceed 0.5 per 100,000 population. Zambia,
for example, has one psychiatrist in government practice for roughly 12 million
people. Psychiatric nurses, social workers and psychologists are in similarly short
supply. Kenya has 250 psychiatric nurses in the country, but the rate of produc-
tion is far less than the rate of loss to retirement, mortality and brain drain (both
overseas and internal). Indeed, in 2009, Kenya only produced one psychiatric
nurse for the country.14
This situation is further complicated by the physical size and geography of
these countries. Outside the RSA, the average area per psychiatrist ranges from
roughly 17,000 km2 in Swaziland, to 342,000 km2 in the Congo. To put that in
context, the comparable number for Australia is 2600 km2, for the United States
of America, 230 km2, and for France and the United Kingdom, 40 km2 per
psychiatrist. Averages in this context must of course be approached with care. In
practice, mental health professionals, and psychiatrists in particular, are likely to
be concentrated in urban areas. For these urban populations, specialist services
will be considerably more accessible than for people outside these urban areas.
For people in rural areas, the concentration of services in cities and the sparse
coverage of primary care means that the nearest medical facilities may be a very
long way away indeed, a difficulty exacerbated by limited public transport
infrastructure.
Available treatments are limited. New generation antipsychotic drugs are
unlikely to be available in the public sector, because of price. Training in new
11 Statistics from the WHO in 2002 show for example that the per capita expenditure on health in
Burundi was US$3 per year; in the Democratic Republic of the Congo US$4 per year; in the Central
African Republic US$ 11 per year; and in Chad and Malawi, US$14 per year: World Health
Organization, Global Health Atlas, available at: www.apps.who.int/globalatlas/.
12 World Health Organization, The World Health Report 2001: Mental Health: New Understanding,
New Hope (Geneva, WHO, 2001) ch 3.
13 World Health Organization, Mental Health Atlas (Geneva, WHO, 2005) also available online at:
www.apps.who.int/globalatlas/default.asp. Since the WHO report, Malawi has successfully recruited a
psychiatrist.
14 My thanks to Rachel Jenkins of the Institute of Psychiatry, King’s College London, for this
example.
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psychological therapies is limited and a shortage of specialists means that in any
event, even where training is available, continuing supervision is difficult. Bed
provision is similarly minimal, and such facilities as there are may be under-
staffed. The result is that facilities may be of poor quality. One African psychia-
trist writes:
Most mental hospitals in Africa are located in the ‘economic ghettos’ of cities, and the
forensic units are in turn located in the ‘ghettos’ of these hospitals, in locations often
termed maximum security units. Though located in hospitals, these units are practically
extensions of prisons, only worse because they exist as ‘orphan’ units that do not belong
to either the medical or prison systems. In addition to the lack of adequate facilities,
most countries have an average of one psychiatrist to a million. Those patients with the
added need for forensic care have even less, and therefore for many people commitment
to one of these units means a life sentence on a daily dose of chlorpromazine,
carbamazepine and malnutrition.
A visit to many of these institutions leads to despair about the state of human rights
and dignity in our continent. Those who are considered lucky are seen by a demoral-
ized, poorly trained, and inadequately paid doctor who passes by the ward once every
few weeks, to see only those patients who are most disturbed. For those who are of no
trouble, there is no review.15
Formalised community support programmes are extremely rare, and indeed are
logistically impractical on a national basis, when numbers of potential clients are
compared with numbers of available specialist staff. Therefore there has long
been recognition that in low-resource settings especially, but also in richer
countries, involvement of primary care is crucial and integration of mental
health into primary care is essential for population access to mental health care.16
While there can be little doubt that this is a desirable way forward, it is not an
unproblematic strategy. Its drivers are at least partly a lack of professional and
financial resources. While getting better use out of minimal resources is of course
desirable, it should not detract attention from the other problem, that mental
health is often significantly under-resourced in the region, with reference to
overall health budgets.
While some family structures apparently continue to be strong, factors such as
poverty, the journeying of breadwinners to seek employment and the death of
potential carers (for example, from HIV) has made sustained family care increas-
ingly problematic. Certainly, the anecdotal reports are that stigma against people
with mental disabilities who return from institutional care is often entrenched,
and sometimes violent.
The treatment picture is complicated by the existence of traditional healers,
who are often the first port of call for the vast bulk of people who suffer from
15 FG Njenga, ‘Forensic Psychiatry: The African Experience’ (2006) 5(2) World Psychiatry 97.
16 For a recent discussion, see A Alem, L Jacobsson and C Hanlon, ‘Community-based Mental
Health Care in Africa: Mental Health Workers’ Views’ (2008) 7(1) World Psychiatry 54.
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mental health problems. There has been little research on the effectiveness of
these treatments in terms of health and social outcomes. Harmful practices have
been documented by some practitioners. Nonetheless, traditional healers are
often well embedded in the community. They are seen to understand the cultural
and community context, and as noted, are a reality in the care system. They do
not necessarily work in opposition to the western-style psychiatrists. In Lesotho,
for example, hospital workers have told me that traditional healers may often
house a person released from hospital, and aid in their re-integration into the
local community.17 Nonetheless, the framework of traditional healers can create
complexities. It would seem that little if any research has been done as to how the
remedies of these healers interact with the medications prescribed by physicians
prescribing western medicines. Further, the cultural structure of the traditional
approach can intersect awkwardly with western medicine. When a patient
identifies his or her condition as flowing from demonic possession, for example,
it may be difficult for a psychiatrist to determine how far this flows from
psychosis, and how far from the fact that this is how the culture articulates some
forms of mental condition.
The legislative framework in these countries is sometimes left over from
colonial days. While some countries have produced new Acts,18 others have no
legislative framework, leading to a lack of meaningful criteria for compulsory
admission or compulsory treatment. Similarly, guardianship legislation is rudi-
mentary, and rarely allows partial guardianship, for example. In practice, in much
of the Southern African region, the overwhelming sense is of the absence of
meaningful legal regulation in the mental health context.
Consistent with this, there appears to be no tradition of engagement of people
with mental health problems with the legal system. Legal representation or
formal advocacy is not a fixture of the mental health system. Again, this should be
placed in perspective: in Lesotho, the state provides defence lawyers to criminally
accused persons only in capital cases. It is thus perhaps unsurprising that they are
not routinely provided to psychiatric patients.
17 Regarding traditional healers and integration with other medicine, see for example O Ayon-
rinde, O Gureje and R Lawal, ‘Psychiatric Research in Nigeria: Bridging Tradition and Modernisation’
(2004) 184 British Journal of Psychiatry 536; SC Moukouta and E Pewzner-Apeloig, ‘Thérapies
traditionnelles-thérapies moderns en milieu psychiatrique au Congo. Syncrétisme ou interference?’
(2002) 160 Annales Médico-psychologiques, Revue Psychiatrique 353.
18 In southern Africa, the Republic of South Africa has particularly good legislation: see Mental
Health Care Act, 2002 (RSA Act no 17, 2002) s 32. While not really in southern Africa, other African
countries have also passed new legislation in recent years. See Tanzania, Mental Health Act, 2008 (Act
no 21/08); Kenya, Mental Health Act c 248 (1991); and Egypt, which passed new legislation (Law for
the Care of mental Patients) in 2009.
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B. Central Europe
Central Europe raises very different questions. Certainly, these countries are
relatively poor by western European standards, but they are considerably
wealthier than the African countries discussed above. As table 1 shows, the
average annual GDP per head is roughly US$10,000 to 20,000—significantly
below western European comparitors, but significantly higher than the African
examples. Similarly, from a simple demographic point of view, there are a much
wider range and stronger concentration of services. Where figures are available,
mental health appears to account for something in the range of three to seven per
cent of health budgets. Once again, this is an under-fund relative to impact of
mental disorders on QuALYs, but these are in general much higher proportions
than the African numbers, and are further based on significantly higher health
budgets.
This follows through into service provision. In the southern African countries
outside the RSA, there are 0.13 to 1.5 mental health beds per 10,000 population;
in central Europe, these numbers are generally between 7.5 and 14—notably
higher than in the comparitors in developed nations, reflecting in part the
ongoing focus on institutional rather than community services in the region.
Psychiatrists and other mental health professionals are similarly much more
readily available, with up to 15 psychiatrists per 100,000 population. And while
organised community care provision is extremely limited in central Europe, there
are generally state financial benefits available to people with mental disabilities.
While certainly not generous, these benefits do allow a financial cushioning of
the transition between institution and community.
Central Europe is thus not a culture where mental health care does not exist.
Instead, the issues are about its nature. There may be no shortage of institutions,
but the institutions are often sadly inadequate. The reports of the European
Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) and other investigative bodies
have chronicled serious deficiencies in institutional care in the region. In a 2002
visit to Karlukovo State Psychiatric Hospital in Bulgaria, for example, the CPT
found that meat, fresh vegetables and fruit were only rarely available, and the
daily per capita allowance for food was less than half a Euro. In practice, the
institution relied on donations of food from relatives of the inmates. The CPT
noted a connection between the limited food and the mortality rate in the
institution.19 While this is certainly a particularly clear example of institutional
deprivation, institutions do seem to be generally large and depressing. The
common use of ‘cage beds’ and ‘net beds’ in significant parts of the region—beds
covered by bars or netting to preclude the occupant from leaving the bed or,
often, from standing up—is one indication of the intensity of control and general
19 European Committee for the Prevention of Torture CPT/Inf (2004) 21 (visit of April 2002) at
paras [132]–[134]. For a more detailed discussion of CPT reports in the context of psychiatric
facilities, see P Bartlett, O Lewis and O Thorold, Mental Disability and the European Convention on
Human Rights (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff, 2007).
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oppressiveness that is still not uncommon.20 An absence of community-based
care means that people may remain in these institutions for long periods of time,
particularly if they have chronic disabilities such as learning disabilities.
These are countries that remain influenced by their Soviet past. In a legal
context, this means that there are almost always legal structures surrounding
confinement,21 often buttressed with procedural protections. Thus in much of
central Europe, civil psychiatric detention may only occur upon the order of a
court, for which a lawyer is provided. The problem with these procedural
protections is that they are often in form only. The report of the Mental Disability
Advocacy Center (MDAC) relating to Hungary provides a particularly clear
example of how these rights lack real meaning. Lawyers often meet clients only at
the court on the day of the hearing, and hearings last only a few minutes.22
Indeed, it would seem that in some countries lawyers do not view it as part of
their role in these hearings to challenge the confinement, raising the question as
to what purpose the hearings are actually meant to achieve.23 The parallels with
the empirical literature on the United States of America 30 years ago are striking.
Once the individual is admitted, plenary guardianship often follows almost as
a matter of routine, often with the director of the hospital or social care home
being appointed as the guardian. Here, the unreformed nature of the legal
systems does create real problems in rights protection. Consistent with classic
Roman law, a person under guardianship loses legal personality. He or she ceases
to be a legal agent who may enforce his or her rights, and this is regardless of the
de facto functional capacity of the individual to make the specific decisions in
question.
Southern Africa and central Europe are thus fundamentally different concep-
tually. Southern Africa is poor, in a world where law is, and has always been,
largely absent in the field of mental health. Central Europe is a world still in the
shadow of its Soviet past, with large psychiatric facilities, battalions of psychiatric
professionals, and a tradition of legal process (although not meaningful legal
involvement). These contexts follow through into the questions of service provi-
sion, and the question of the place of rights in these regions. For southern Africa,
the question is how to build an appropriate system essentially from scratch; in
central Europe, the question is how to ‘turn the super-tanker’.
What they share is a history of political and social indifference to mental health
issues. In neither region has there been the political support for the development
of adequate mental health programmes, nor of the user involvement movement,
20 Regarding cage beds in particular, see Mental Disability Advocacy Center (MDAC), Cage Beds:
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment in Four EU Accession Countries (Budapest, MDAC, 2003) available
at: www.mdac.info/documents/118_MDAC_Cage_Bed_Report.pdf.
21 The obvious exception is Latvia, which appears to have no functioning mental health legisla-
tion.
22 Mental Disability Advocacy Center (MDAC), Liberty Denied (Budapest, MDAC, 2004).
23 P Bartlett, T Simmins, M Deric´ and M Zadro, An Analysis of the Mental Health Regulations in
Bosnia and Herzegovina with Recommendations (Sarajevo, Council of Europe, 2008).
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that has occurred in economically advantaged countries over the last roughly 40
years. In both regions, the question is how to kick-start change.
IV. Rights over the Self
Unless we are to abandon the rule of law completely regarding mental disability
in these jurisdictions, the legal starting point must be the assurance of an
appropriate legal structure in domestic law. That, along with relevant domestic
policy and the financial resources, provides the legal groundwork for the provi-
sion of a system of care and support for people with mental disabilities. The
specific content of such law and policy is a much wider subject than can be
addressed in this chapter. Suffice it to say that, as noted in the first section of this
chapter, the legal and cultural traditions are not in place for what people in
economically privileged countries would view as appropriate standards of care,
and appropriate standards and provision of community-based care in particular.
It is appropriate to remember where the real arguments for this sort of rights
lie. Perhaps most significant is the application of power to the individual.
Sometimes the authorities are wrong, or at least not so clearly right that they
should be allowed to do what they want. Sometimes these errors are manifest—
the ambulance attendants bring the wrong person to hospital, for example, or
there are clear and material errors in the medical record upon which compulsion
is based. One hopes that such egregious errors are uncommon, but experience
indicates that they certainly occur. Much more frequently, issues of compulsion
will be in a grey area of: how does a legal standard apply to the situation of this
individual? This does not alter the fact that the effects on the individual are likely
to be substantial—deprivation of liberty, enforced treatment, loss of control over
property, for example—and he or she must have a right to ensure that the
decision meets the appropriate standards.
The arguments for such rights also concern the governance of those who care
for people with mental disabilities, be they professionals or family members.
These individuals exercise power. It may be a platitude, but it is nonetheless a
valuable platitude that power unchecked is a recipe for power abused. Certainly,
the provision of individual rights to challenge these carers is not on its own a
sufficient check for such power, but it enforces a particular relationship between
the carer and the individual. The experience in economically advantaged coun-
tries is that the move towards engagement with users, the rise of the user
involvement movement, and the consequent reshaping of mental health policy
occurred in parallel with the development of and increased exercise of individual
rights of service users. While it is difficult to see that such correlations can be
researched with rigour—there are too many confounding variables—it is intui-
tively arguable that the new, engaged and active role accorded to service users
flows, to a relevant degree, from the fact that this active role could be enforced: a
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culture has developed in these countries where service users can, in a judicial or
quasi-judicial forum, have their voices heard and require carers to justify their
actions. Engagement without such enforcement becomes a crumb dropping from
the master’s table, at the master’s behest; and in this day and age, that is no way to
build a mental health system.
As noted above, these rights often do not currently exist in a meaningful way
outside economically advantaged countries. In Latvia and in much of southern
Africa, there appears to be no functioning mental health law, let alone a law
which creates the opportunity for service users to challenge or engage with the
decisions regarding compulsion that are made about them. In much of central
Europe, as noted above, persons found incapable under a judicial process,
sometimes without notifying them of the hearing,24 lose their legal personhood,
and no longer have standing in court. Furthermore, even in those parts of central
Europe where court hearings occur as a matter of routine, they appear often to be
mere formalities, with little meaningful engagement with users and their rights.
On some of these points, the situation in central Europe in particular bears
some relationship to the American situation in the 1960s: law and institutions
exist; the question is how to make the law relevant at the local level. That would
suggest that the development of a legal culture for service users might be an
appropriate way forward, to take better and meaningful advantage of the existing
frameworks. In southern Africa, by comparison, little relevant law exists, let alone
a legal culture prepared for litigation in this area. In both cases, we are a long way
from a world where it can be taken for granted that users of psychiatric services
and people with learning disabilities can in practice contest their rights, and
where they will be taken seriously by the legal system.
The difficulties of developing litigation in this area are not merely formal,
however. It is not merely that there is no culture of litigation, it is also that the
user may well be in an institution where order is maintained by the effect of
long-standing institutionalisation, by coercion, or occasionally by violence. Cer-
tainly, in a total institution, life for an individual challenging the institution is
unlikely to be made pleasant by the institutional staff. It is fair to ask how their
safety is to be assured in the roughly six years it now takes between an application
to the European Court of Human Rights and its final determination, plus of
course the time required for the prerequisite exhaustion of domestic remedies.
Perhaps as problematic is the question of what can rights look like in these
cultural contexts? The issues for central Europe and southern Africa appear
different here, as central Europe is markedly more culturally similar to western
Europe: society within individual countries is not generally based on ethnic or
24 See, eg Shtukaturov v Russia (App No 44009/05) judgment 27 March 2008. For more detailed
discussion of guardianship in central Europe, see the reports of MDAC, available at www.mdac.info.
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cultural tribes; court systems, legal systems and psychiatric systems exist in a
broadly similar way to the rest of Europe; and there is not generally the grinding
poverty of much of southern Africa.
How relevant are the cultural differences between the economically privileged
countries in which human rights have developed and southern Africa? Obviously,
such differences exist and cannot be ignored, but they must be approached with
come care, since ‘cultural difference’ can frequently become a mask for stigma
and oppression. The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, for exam-
ple, specifically protects the role of the family as ‘the natural unit and basis of
society’.25 This has led to some debate as to whether families should have a
particularly strong role in African mental health law.26 While the role of families
in African society, both in practice and in their human rights charter, may be
significant, it is not obvious how it should be translated into mental health law.
The reality is that mental disability still carries considerable stigma in much of
Africa, and the risk is that families will choose not to offer care within the family,
but instead to leave an individual in an institutional setting as long as possible. As
such, the risk is that this becomes a right to exclude the person from the family
rather than to include them.
That said, it is difficult to see that a system of law and rights can work without
engagement with local culture. Quite how we should expect that to work in
southern Africa is an open question. Certainly, unless patterns of service provi-
sion change dramatically, it is difficult to see that the western model of tribunals,
with a psychiatrist, a lay person and a lawyer, can function: there are simply not
enough psychiatrists. It does not of course follow that rights cannot be pursued.
The RSA, which like the rest of southern Africa has a shortage of psychiatrists in
some parts of the country, has expanded the psychiatric role on the review board
to include other mental health professionals.27 That might provide a different
model. Alternatively, in some parts of southern Africa, indigenous courts still
exist, and have an active role in the community. One might imagine that they
might appropriately be used for determination of matters of dispute in this area.
How successful that approach would be no doubt depends on a variety of
external factors: Do the courts function effectively and with the respect of all who
would be party to disputes about psychiatric coercion? Can they readily be
trained with the necessary legal knowledge to apply the statute? And are there
issues of stigma among the court officers that would preclude application of a
rights-based law in the way the law intends? Whatever is decided, the court or
25 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR), opened for signature 27 June 1981,
1520 UNTS 217 (entered into force 21 October 1986) art 18.
26 See, eg the article by Dr Ahmed Okasha in the newspaper Al-Masry al-Youm, 4 March 2009.
27 See Mental Health Care Act 2002 (RSA) s 1(xvii), 20(2)(a).
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court-like body must have the confidence of service users, mental health profes-
sionals, and the local community. We still know very little of how these practicali-
ties will play out in domestic contexts in southern Africa: we are still too near the
beginning of the process of legislative development.
For any of this to work, of course, local policy-makers must come to under-
stand the relevance of the issues. It does seem that a critical mass of those charged
with care of people with mental disabilities is aware of the problems and the
issues of stigma surrounding service users, but it is far from obvious in either
central Europe or southern Africa that this constitutes a majority of psychiatric
professionals, let alone a national consensus. If we are to see meaningful
entrenchment of human rights values in psychiatric and learning disability
services in these countries, significant changes of attitude will be required among
the bulk of practitioners, policy-makers, governments and the public.
That reminds us that the provision of individual rights is only one part of a
much bigger project, involving changed attitudes to users of psychiatric and
learning disability services and to the provision of mental health services. If
individual rights are merely a part of that larger picture, they are nonetheless an
integral part. Appropriate provision of services in the twenty-first century
requires safe environments for users, an end to unregulated coercion, an atmos-
phere of trust between users and service providers, enhanced dignity for service
users and a move towards engagement of service users in their care. For these to
become more than policy ‘tick boxes’, they must be buttressed by mechanisms of
enforcement, and those must include mechanisms for the individual service users
to ensure that standards are applied in their cases. Nonetheless, individual rights
are clearly part of a bigger picture.
V. Issues of Systemic Litigation and Enforcement
As is well-known in economically privileged countries, individual rights have
their limits, and this is nowhere more evident than in the psychiatric and learning
disability realms. It has been acknowledged since the ground-breaking paper of
Janet Gilboy and John Schmidt over 30 years ago28 that coercion frequently
occurs outside law, in situations where ‘voluntary’ patients do not perceive
themselves as having real choices in their psychiatric admission or treatment.
Further, a significant proportion of users of psychiatric and learning disability
services will be in a position of sufficient vulnerability that they will not be able
to instigate legal proceedings. This vulnerability may, as noted above, flow from
conditions in the individual’s place of care: he or she may not feel that it is safe to
‘rock the boat’. It may also of course flow from the individual’s disability. While
28 J Gilboy and J Schmidt, ‘“Voluntary” Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill’ (1971) 66 Northwestern
University Law Review 429. See also Bernadette McSherry, this volume, ch 16.
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certainly many people with mental health problems or learning disability are able
to stand up for their own rights, the reality is that some are not. Further, and
perhaps more significantly, successful litigation of individual rights may provide
a remedy to the individual litigant, but may fail to address over-arching and
systemic problems in the mental health care system.
Some of the mechanisms to address these problems will not necessarily involve
litigation. Boards of inspection, for example, may be an important way to police
and enhance standards of care provision, even if they have no right to go to court
to enforce their concerns. Their efficacy will however be determined by the
appropriateness of appointments made to the boards, and how effective the
extra-legal mechanisms are to ensure that their recommendations or findings are
acted upon. Even in developed democracies, there are numerous examples of
reports and notices of violation issued by these inspection panels left gathering
dust, making no meaningful difference. In these circumstances, access to courts
by these boards (combined with sufficient budgets to make such access practica-
ble) may be important.
Of greater relevance to the theme of this volume is systemic litigation, either by
way of test-case, class action, or other mechanism. The efficacy of this approach
in the economically developed world has been patchy. In England, there has been
little litigation to enforce standards of service provision, and such litigation as has
occurred has by and large been unsuccessful.29 In the United States of America,
by comparison, some early cases relating to standards of care and justifications
for confinement were instrumental in establishing the human rights culture in a
psychiatric context.30 To what degree does systemic litigation represent a way
forward for southern Africa and central Europe?
Any optimism must be limited. At best, litigation will only be as strong as the
right protected in the formal legal instrument, and key rights in this area are
often, to use the prevailing euphemism, ‘aspirational’. As an obvious example, the
right to health appears in a wide variety of international legal instruments, but is
generally qualified by reference to the ‘best available’ standard of health, or with
an express reference to affordability.31 This rather woolly language severely limits
the potential success of litigation, providing courts with an invitation to avoid the
difficult economic decisions that health care choices involve. Further, many of
29 See, eg R v Gloucestershire County Council, ex parte Barry [1997] 2 All ER 1 (HL); R (on the
application of K) v Camden and Islington Health Authority [2001] EWCA 240; R (on the application of
Stennett) v Manchester City Council [2002] UKHL 34 is something of an exception, as it requires the
state to pay community aftercare services that are mandatory under the Act, although it does not
define what services are mandatory under the Act.
30 Addington v Texas, 441 US 418 (1979); O’Connor v Donaldson, 422 US 563 (1975); Schmidt v
Lessard, 414 US 473 (1974); Romeo v Youngberg, 644 F 2d 147 (3rd Cir 1980).
31 See, eg ACHPR art 16; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UN
GA res 2200A (XXI), 21 UNGAOR Supp (No 16) at 49, UN Doc A/6316 (1966), 993 UNTS 3 (entered
into force 3 January 1976) art 12; European Social Charter (Revised), ETS 163, arts 1(11), 11.
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these rights are contained in international instruments that have no enforcement
mechanisms for individuals, and may not be incorporated into domestic law.
Nonetheless, there are some indications that systemic litigation may some-
times be a useful way forward. In Bulgaria, for example, recent cases brought
jointly by the Mental Disability Advocacy Center (MDAC) and the Bulgarian
Helsinki Committee have resulted in findings that Bulgaria’s failure properly to
educate children with intellectual disabilities constituted a violation of the
European Social Charter,32 and that differential payments to people receiving
community benefits based respectively on age, learning disability, and mental
health problems was discriminatory under Bulgarian domestic law. In Russia, an
MDAC test-case relating to procedures of guardianship has resulted in findings
both at the European Court of Human Rights and the Russian Constitutional
Court that the procedures for assessing incapacity and awarding guardianship
must be fundamentally altered, to allow significant involvement of the person
allegedly lacking capacity.33 In the event that these cases result in significant
systemic reforms, real and tangible results may follow for large numbers of
people. At the international level, European Court of Human Rights jurispru-
dence has established broad framework requirements for civil detention,34
although it has been less helpful in establishing minimal standards of care in
facilities.35
A caveat is appropriate, however, in that the existing structures of human
rights import an agenda as to what sorts of right are important. There is little
doubt that it is easier under the European Convention on Human Rights for
example, to ensure standards of care in facilities than it is to require the provision
of care services in the community. The result of litigation in this area, therefore,
might well be that funds are spent to improve facilities, at least to the point that
they are no longer violating human rights. This presents advocates with a
dilemma. If expenditure is made in this way, people will still be in the institu-
tions; merely in marginally less bad institutions (or, conceivably, good institu-
tions?). It is difficult to see that governments that are required to spend money on
these institutions will quickly abandon them for community models of care: the
focus on institutional models of care is thus buttressed, not challenged. At the
same time, is it really acceptable not to litigate the standards of care in these
places, and thus to leave people in manifestly sub-standard conditions, in the
hope that community services may come?
It is not obvious that the human rights priorities necessarily match the
priorities of the service users. To take a concrete example, I have in central
32 Mental Disability Advocacy Center (MDAC) v Bulgaria, European Committee of Social Rights,
complaint 41/2007, decision of 10 June 2008.
33 See Shtukaturov v Russia (App No 44009/05) judgment 27 March 2008; see also decision of
Russian Constitutional Court, 27 February 2009.
34 See Winterwerp v The Netherlands (1979) 2 EHRR 387.
35 See, eg Herczegfalvy v Austria (1992) 15 EHRR 437, where prolonged handcuffing of an
individual did not violate the prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment.
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Europe visited a ward where everyone was dressed only in nappies. There was no
obvious reason for this—the residents did not appear to be incontinent. Unsur-
prisingly, I found this situation distressing, and I suspect if the situation found its
way to litigation, there would be a good chance that a court would make a finding
of degrading treatment. It is much less obvious that the people on the ward
viewed the situation as intolerable. The visit did not allow me to speak with the
residents, but it is further fair to wonder whether the matters that were of
concern to them are matters that human rights law would rate as important.
VI. Conclusion
In the background of much of this discussion has been the discursive power of
rights. In the period after the fall of the Berlin Wall, there was tremendous
enthusiasm in central Europe for engagement with the western European con-
ceptions of rights, in part as a way of drawing a line under the events of the
previous half century. While the subsequent 20 years have taken some of the
bloom off the rose in this regard, rights continue to have discursive power in
these countries.
Africa, once again, is different: with the exception of the RSA, human rights do
not appear to be articulated as the marker for distinction from an old and
oppressive régime. Instead, the risk is that human rights are perceived as merely
the latest form of colonialism, creating a much more ambiguous climate for
reform. That said, African nations are signing up to the key United Nations
human rights instruments, and Africa does have its own charter of human
rights,36 buttressed by its own African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights.37
Insofar as the discursive power of rights and law can be harnessed to the
advantage of people with mental disabilities, it may well be a helpful tool in
bringing about systemic reform to mental health services. It allows service users
to be re-created as persons with a role and a stake in the care system—a
development largely taken for granted in economically privileged countries, but
which is still largely absent in central Europe and southern Africa.
So where does this leave us? Rights do matter. They matter because sometimes
they matter in individual cases; they matter because sometimes the political
culture of rights and also their discursive impact can influence governments into
useful action. Certainly, both those objectives are important. We have also
known, since the earliest days of the law and society movement, that rights only
36 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, opened for signature 27 June 1981, 1520 UNTS
217 (entered into force 21 October 1986).
37 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights on the Establishment of an
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 9 June 1998, OAU Doc OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/
PROT (III).
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matter if accompanied by political and social advocacy, before, in parallel with,
and after litigation. There can be little doubt that this is a lesson that must also be
applied in central Europe and southern Africa. Rights do not happen in a
vacuum. They happen as part of social and political movements. They are,
however, a necessary part of those movements.
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